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NEW YORK TIMES v. SULLIVAN:
A RETROSPECTIVE EXAMINATION
Bruce L. Ottley *
John Bruce Lewis**
Younghee Jin Ottley***
It has been twenty years since the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' The Court's opinion
in that case has had an unprecedented and continuing impact both on the
law of defamation and on first amendment rights.2 Most of the literature
dealing with the New York Times case has focused on the constitutional
aspects of the decision or its implications for the development of future legal
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University of Iowa; LL.M., Columbia University.
** Attorney, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A., J.D., University of
Missouri; LL.M., Columbia University.
*** Attorney, Continental Bank, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Seoul National University (Korea);
J.D., DePaul University.
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, the Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating
to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
Id. at 279-80.
2. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the Supreme Court extended
the actual malice standard to defamatory statements concerning "public figures." Id. at 155.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), the Court said that persons suing the media for
invasion of privacy must also meet the actual malice standard of New York Times. Id. at
387-88. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), marked the furthest expansion
of the first amendment in defamation cases. In Rosenbloom, the Court held that plaintiffs
must prove actual malice in defamation cases involving "matters of general public concern"
regardless of the fame or anonymity of the participants. Id. at 43-44. In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court reaffirmed its holdings in New York Times and Butts
but said that Rosenbloom had gone too far. Id. at 342-43. The Court viewed Rosenbloom
as an unacceptable encroachment on the legitimate state interest in the protection of reputa-
tion. Id. at 347-48. The Court based the application of the actual malice test on a distinction
between public officials/public figures and private individuals. Id. at 351-52. The principal defama-
tion cases since Gertz have been concerned with defining who is a public official or public
figure. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (a man who had once been cited
for contempt for refusing to appear before a grand jury investigating Soviet espionage was
not a public figure when he sued a book which listed him as a Soviet agent); Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) (a scientist who received federal funds for research purposes
was not a public figure for purposes of a libel suit against a United States Senator who ridiculed
the research as a wasteful expenditure of public funds); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 153
(1976) (a wealthy Florida socialite involved in a divorce suit was not a public figure). The
Court has held, however, that the plaintiff's attorney has the right to inquire about a reporter's
state of mind in preparing a news story in order to establish actual malice. See Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979).
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principles.' It is important to remember, however, that the case had its genesis
in the tumult and controversy surrounding the civil rights movement of the
early 1960's. Thus, the decision cannot be analyzed at the dispassionate level
of first amendment theory alone but must be viewed as an extraordinarily
significant product of the civil rights movement.
It is the position of the authors that the compelling facts surrounding the
case, as much, as pre-existing constitutional principles, led to the New York
Times decision. Thus, an understanding of New York Times requires an
examination of the case in its historical and procedural context.' That con-
3. Few Supreme Court decisions have been the subject of as many law review articles
as New York Times. For a general discussion of the constitutional and tort ramifications, see
Berney, Libel and the First Amendment, 51 VA. L. REV. 1 (1965); Brennan, The Supreme
Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965);
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amend-
ment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191; Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to
Return to "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 8 COLUM. J. ART & L. 1 (1983);
Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First Amendment, 55 GEO. L.J. 234 (1966); Nimmer, The
Right to Speak from Times to Time, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968); Pedrick, Freedom of the
Press, 49 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1964); Pierce, The Anatomy of An Historic Decision: New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1965).
4. Shortly after New York Times was decided, Professor Harry Kalven commented:
The Times case has to be read against the sociological reality which produced it.
First the publication in Alabama was tenuous in the extreme; the advertisement
was addressed to the normal audience of the Times; it appears that less than four
hundred copies of the 650,000 circulation of the Times were circulated in Alabama
and only thirty-five copies in the county in question. Second, other suits from the
same advertisement were pending, threatening several million dollars more in damages.
Third, there is, at least in Northern eyes, something disingenuous about the response
of the Southern jury to the defamation involved; it involves the South in a showing
of moral shock at vigorous conduct countering the Negro protest movement. In
brief, although there was perhaps a technical libel involved, the impression is that
the technicality was pounced on and exploited in Southern irritation over Northern
interference in the civil-rights controversy.
H. KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 54-55 (1965). In his article entitled
The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,"
1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, Professor Kalven was also mindful of the connection between the
Negro protest movement and the New York Times decision. He declared:
[Elven a cursory examination of the case reveals that the decision was responsive
to the pressures of the day created by the Negro protest movement and thus raises
the question so frequently mooted whether the Supreme Court has adhered to neutral
principles in reaching its conclusion. . . . IT]he case is a major instance of the
important consequences of the civil rights issue and the apparatus of protest that
accompanies it. The Negro movement is making significant constitutional law not
only in the area of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause but in
unexpected sectors of First Amendment theory. Whatever the irritations and crises
of 'the long hot summer,' the protest has maintained the dignity of political action,
of an elaborate petition for redress of grievances. And no one has been more sen-
sitive to this soiciological reality t han the Supreme Court itself.
Id. at 192-93. A similar view was echoed recently in an article by newspaper columnist and
lecturer Anthony Lewis:
What was at stake on the facts of the Sullivan case was more than the fate of
one newspaper. It was the ability, or the willingness, of the American press to
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text linked the civil rights movement, the news media, and white Alabama
officials in a struggle much larger than a single lawsuit. This article will
examine the civil rights origins of the case, the participants, their motives,
and the related litigation. It will then turn to a detailed analysis of the New
York Times case itself as it progressed through the courts and culminated
in the Supreme court decision.
I. THE ORIGINS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
A. Introduction
In March 1960, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. was one of the
leaders of the rapidly growing civil rights movement.' Dr. King had first
come to national prominence four years earlier when, as president of the
Montgomery Improvement Association, he led the campaign to desegregate
the Montgomery, Alabama bus lines. 6 As the president of the Southern Chris-
tian Leadership Conference,7 he quickly rose to the forefront of the non-
violent struggle for black civil rights in the South.
Because of his civil rights activities, Dr. King became the target of sporadic
violence and harassment. His home was the subject both of bomb and gun-
shot attacks.' In 1956 Dr. King was convicted of violating the Alabama
go on covering the racial conflict in the South as it had been doing. Those were
very different times in Alabama and Mississippi and large parts of other states
in the Deep South: Blacks could not vote, much less attend school or eat a restaurant
meal or ride a bus on a nonracial basis. To challenge the racial system was dangerous;
physical violence and threats were common. The national press, print and broad-
cast, played an extremely important part in bringing all this to the attention of
the rest of the country, in arousing the federal government to corrective action
and hence in changing the ways of the South. Of course those who wished to preserve
what was then called "the Southern way of life" did not like the press when it
intruded into that life. Justice Black, who was from Alabama, observed in his con-
curring opinion in the Sullivan case that white Southern feelings were especially
hostile "to so-called outside agitators"-a term, Justice Black drily added, that
"can be made to fit papers like the Times, when it is published in New York."
Lewis, supra note 3, at 3-4 (footnotes omitted). In Hugo Black and the Judicial Revolution,
author Gerald Dunn also recognized the linkage between the civil rights movement and New
York Times. G. DUNN, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 384 (1977). When the Supreme
Court decided the New York Times case, it was aware of the related cases which arose from
media coverage of the black protest movement in Montgomery, Alabama. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama at 19, 6 Record, New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. The most comprehensive biography of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is S. OATES, LET
THE TRUMPET SOUND (1982). For a summary of Dr. King's career and of his confrontations
with southern law enforcement officials, see C. KING, THE WORDS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR. 7-13, 99-110 (1983).
6. For an account of the Montgomery bus boycott and Dr. King's role in it, see M. KING,
JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY STORY (1958); S. OATES, supra note 5, at
68-109.
7. See S. OATES, supra note 5, at 147.
8. See Minister Who Led Boycott in Montgomery Tells of Night Shotgun Attack, N.Y.
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criminal boycott statute because of his efforts in desegregating the
Montgomery bus lines.' That same year he was also arrested for speeding;
two years later he was arrested for loitering.'"
In February 1960, Dr. King was arrested on a charge of perjury in con-
nection with the filing of his Alabama state income tax return." Under
Alabama law, this was a felony carrying a maximum penalty of ten years
imprisonment.' 2 The "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South" was formed and, on March 29, 1960,
it published an appeal for funds in a full-page advertisement in the New
York Times (Times) entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices"."
The first paragraph of that advertisement described the actions and goals
of "Southern Negro students" demonstrating "in positive affirmation of the
right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and
the Bill of Rights."" It went on to charge that these students were "being
met by an unprecedented wave of terror."" The second paragraph claimed
that when 400 students tried to integrate lunch-counters in Orangeburg, South
Carolina, they were forcibly ejected, tear-gassed, arrested en masse, and
herded into an open barbed-wire stockade.
The third paragraph in the advertisement declared:
In Montgomery, Alabama after students sang "My Country 'Tis of Thee"
on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and
truckloads of police armed with shot-guns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama
State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state
authorities by refusing to re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in
an attempt to starve them into submission. 6
The fourth paragraph spoke of student activity in "Tallahassee, Atlanta,
Nasille, Savannah, Greensboro, Memphis, Richmond, Charlotte and a host
Times, Dec. 24, 1956, reprinted in 4 Record at 1501, New York Times. The January 30, 1956
bombing of King's home is discussed in S. OATES, supra note 5, at 86.
9. See Court Holds Key to Bus Boycott, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1956, reprinted in 4 Record
at 1618, New York Times, Answers of Defendant, New York Times Co., to Interrogatories,
5 Record at 1930, 1934, New York Times.
10. The arrest of King for speeding is discussed in S. OATES, supra note 5, at 83-84. See
also Answers of Defendant, New York Times Co,. to Interrogatories, 5 Record at 1930, 1934,
New York Times (King was convicted and fined ten dollars).
11. See S. OATES, supra note 5, at 150-53. In May 1960, after a week's trial in Montgomery,
Alabama, King was found not guilty of tax evasion by an all white jury. Id. at 153. For addi-
tional discussion, see Testimony of John R. Matthew, Transcript of Proceedings on Merits,
2 Record at 680, New York Times; Brief for the Petitioner at 9, 6 Record, New York Times;
Motion of the Washington Post Company for Leave to File a Brief As Amicus Curiae And
Brief Of The Washington Post Company As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Petitioner at 4,
6 Record, New York Times.
12. See Answers of Defendant, New York Times Co., to Interrogatories, 5 Record at 1930,
1937, New York Times.
13. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1960, at 25, reprinted in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292-93.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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of other cities in the South" referring to the students as "protagonists of
democracy."' 7 The fifth paragraph praised Dr. King as a symbol and
inspiration to the civil rights movement and stated that the "Southern
violators of the Constitution"" were determined to destroy him.
The sixth paragraph stated:
Again and again the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful
protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost
killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have
arrested him seven times-for "speeding," "loitering," and similar
"offenses." And now they have charged him with "perjury"-a felony
under which they could imprison him for ten years.9
The remaining four paragraphs called upon "men and women of good will"
to add their "moral support" and "material help . . . [to] those who are
taking the risks, facing jail and even death in a glorious re-affirmation of our
Constitution and its Bill of Rights." 2 The names of the sixty-four persons
who comprised the "Committee to Defend Martin Luther King and the
Struggle for Freedom in the South" appeared directly below the text of the
appeal. 2' The list included the names of A. Philip Randolph, Eleanor
Roosevelt, Ertha Kitt, Norman Thomas, Marion Brando, and Harry
Belafonte.22 Below these names was the statement: "We, in the South, who
are struggling daily for dignity and freedom warmly endorse this appeal." ' 3
Below this statement was a list of twenty names, primarily ministers who
lived and worked in the South.2" Among the names were four Alabama
residents: Ralph Abernathy, Fred Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and J. E.
Lowery.25
Exactly two weeks after the publication of the advertisement, another event
occured which also resulted in litigation between southern officials and the
news media. On April 12, 1960, the Times published a front page article
written by Harrison Salisbury entitled "Fear and Hatred Grip Birmingham."
2 6
In the article, Salisbury reported that as a result of the climate of racial
fear in Birmingham, blacks and whites were afraid to talk freely, telephones
were tapped, mail was opened (and some not delivered), and watchmen stood
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1960, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in New York Times v. Conner, 365
F.2d 567, 577 (5th Cir. 1966). For an account of the article concerning Eugene Conner, see
B. MUSE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE 261-63 (1964). The case law reflects some apparent confu-
sion regarding the spelling of the name "Conner." In some cases it is spelled "Conner" while
in others it is spelled "Connor." In order to avoid confusion, this article will consistently
use the former spelling.
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guard at black churches and Jewish temples.27 Salisbury quoted blacks who
called Birmingham "the Johannesburg of America." 28 The only person
specifically named in the article was the Birmingham Police Commissioner,
Eugene "Bull" Conner, to whom a number of unfavorable quotes were
attributed.29
Both the March 29th advertisement and the April 12th article resulted in
editorial protests by the southern press.3" On April 8, 1960, the three city
commissioners of Montgomery individually wrote to the Times and the four
Alabama ministers and demanded a retraction of the statements contained
in the March 29th advertisement. 3' On April 15 counsel for the Times assured
them that the assertions were being checked and asked for further explana-
27. N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1960, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in New York Times Co. v. Conner,
365 F.2d 567, 577 (5th Cir. 1966).
28. Id.
29. The following statements were made about Eugene Conner in Salisbury's article:
By Birmingham custom, persons charged with vagrancy are not admitted to bail.
They are held incommunicado for three days. In actual practice, such a prisoner
is sometimes permitted to make one telephone call. But not always. A person arrested
on a vagrancy warrant simply disappears for three days. His friends and family
may not know what has happened to him.
This is a favorite technique of Birmingham's Police Commissioner, Eugene Conner.
Mr. Conner is a former sports broadcaster known as "Bull" because of the timbre
of his voice. He served as Birmingham Police commissioner for sixteen years in
the late Nineteen Thirties and Nineteen Forties. His administration was a stormy one.
He went into eclipse for several years but made a comeback in 1958 running
on a platform of race hate.
"Bull is the law in Birmingham, like it or not," a businessman said.
Mr. Conner is the author of many widely quoted aphorisms. He once said:
"Damn the law - down here we make our own law." On another occasion
he declared:
"White and Negro are not to segregate together."
N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1960, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365
F.2d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. Among the critical editorials were: The Times and Salisbury, Alabama Journal, May
7, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2151, New York Times, Birmingham Statements Published
in the Times, Montgomery Advertiser, May 4, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2023, New York
Times; (Reply to N.Y. Times) Not a City of Race Terror, Alabama Journal, Apr. 22, 1960,
reprinted in 5 Record at 2145, New York Times; Unworthy Newspaper Policy, Alabama Journal,
Apr. 18, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2139, New York Times; The Abolitionist Hellmouths,
Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 17, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2013, New York Times, 'The
Big Lie' Editor- Wonders Where The New York Times Got Its News, Montgomery Advertiser,
Apr. 15, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2008, New York Times; Not The First Lie About
South, Alabama Journal, Apr. 9, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2134, New York Times; Will
They Purge Themselves? Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 7, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2127,
New YorkTimes.
31. Sullivan's letters to the New York Times (Times) and the four Alabama ministers are
set out in 5 Record at 1949, 1962, 1964, 1965, 1967, New York Times. For media coverage
of these events see Commissioners Demand Retraction, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 9, 1960,
reprinted in 5 Record at 2000, New York Times; City Demands Retraction of Ad in Times,
Alabama Journal, Apr. 9, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2131, New York Times.
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tion as to why the commissioners believed the statements applied to them.32
The city commissioners did not reply, but on April 19 filed the first of a
series of civil suits which were brought in federal and state courts in Alabama
against the Times, four Alabama minsters, the Rev. King and the Columbia
Broadcasting System.33 In addition, on September 6, 1960, a grand jury in
Bessemar, Alabama indicted Harrison Salisbury on forty-two counts of
criminal libel arising out of his article in the Times.3"
To the various Southern officials, these suits against the Times were "test
cases," not in the usual legal sense in which that term is used, but rather
as one means of striking back at the outside criticism and pressure for change
that was mounting against the South." At the time of these publications
in the Times, the civil rights movement was at a critical stage. The economic
boycott of 1957-58 in Montgomery had been one of the first tests of strength
for the growing civil rights movement, and its success, along with the
emergence of the leadership of Dr. King, foretold of bolder steps into new
areas.
The year 1960 marked the beginning of new efforts at desegregation sym-
bolized by the lunch-counter sit-ins, the first of which occured in Greensboro,
North Carolina in February.36 To many white southerners, the civil rights
movement was viewed as part of a communist inspired and dominated
conspiracy.37 Articles and advertisements such as those published by the Times
in the early months of 1960 confirmed the view that, at the very least, out-
side agitation was the source of these disturbances.
The stakes involved on both sides of the resulting controversy were very
high. The plaintiffs saw themselves as representatives of the South and
32. The letter from Lord, Day & Lord, counsel for Times, to L.B. Sullivan is set out in
5 Record at 1951, New York Times. The letter stated in part:
We have been investigating the matter and are somewhat puzzled as to how you
think the statements in any way reflect on you. So far, our investigation would
seem to indicate that the statements are substantially correct with the sole excep-
tion that we find no justification for the statement that the dining hall in the State
College was "padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission."
Id.
33. For a discussion of the suits filed in Montgomery County Circuit Court, see infra text
accompanying notes 42-61. For a discussion of the suits brought in federal court, see infra
text accompanying notes 62-97.
34. See Jefferson Jury Indicts Times Writer For Libel, Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 7,
1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2054, New York Times; Salisbury Is Indicted For Times Articles,
Alabama Journal, Sept. 7, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2195, New York Times.
35. See The Abolitionist Hellmouths, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 17, 1960, reprinted in
5 Record at 2013, New York Times; 'The Big Lie' Editor-Wonders Where The New York
Times Got Its News, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 15, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2008,
New York Times.
36. For accounts of the 1960 lunch-counter sit-ins, see M. KoNvITz, A CENTURY OF CIVIL
RIGHTS 137-38 (1961); B. MUSE, supra note 26, at 204-06.
37. See B. MUSE, supra note 26, at 40. For King's response to charges that the civil rights
movement was led by communists, see S. OATES, supra note 5, at 94.
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believed that their power, position, and way of life were under attack. If
they won, newspapers would hesitate to publish critical articles out of fear
of potential libel suits. Illustrative of this view is an editorial in the
Montgomery Advertiser on May 22, 1960, which stated: "The Advertiser
has no doubt that the recent checkmating of the Times in Alabama will
impose a restraint upon other publications which have hitherto printed about
the South what was supposed to be." 3 The plaintiffs hoped that these suits
would create a serious obstacle to those demanding further change. If the
plaintiffs lost, the press would be free to publish and circulate critical articles
and the pressure for change would inevitably increase.
The issues at stake for the Times were of a much broader significance
than simply its own defense in a libel action. If it lost, there was not only
the threat of a sizeable judgment,39 but the news media's ability to criticize
government officials would be severely hampered. In addition, the Times
argued that the threat of libel actions arising out of reporting highly con-
troversial issues might force it to reduce its Alabama circulation in order
to avoid the state's "long-arm" statute."0 This issue was later converted into
a constitutional argument that despite the state's interest in protecting libeled
individuals, the threat of a libel suit in such cases might constitute an
infringement of first amendment rights.4 '
B. Suits Filed in Montgomery County Circuit Court
Although the suit filed by Montgomery City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan
against the Times was eventually decided by the United States Supreme Court,
a review of related litigation is required to put the case in its proper historical
and procedural contexts. On April 19, 1960, Earl James, Frank Parks, and
L. B. Sullivan, the three city commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama,
individually filed suits in the Montgomery County Circuit Court against the
Times, Ralph D. Abernathy, Fred L. Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and
J. E. Lowery seeking damages of $500,000 against each of the defendants. 2
38. Fall-Out From Ad Error, Montgomery Advertiser, May 22, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record
at 2025, New York Times.
39. The total amount of damages sought by the plaintiffs from the Times was $5,600,000.
40. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 199(I) (1960) provided in part that,
[any . . . corporation not qualified under the Constitution and laws of this State,
who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this
State shall, by the doing of such business or the performing of such work, or ser-
vices, be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State, to be the true and lawful
attorney or agent of such nonresident, upon whom process may be served in any
action accrued or accruing from the doing of such business, or the performing
of such work, or service, or as an incident thereto by any such nonresident or
their agent, or servant or employee.
Id.
41. This argument was made by the Times both in the suit brought by Conner and in the
action by Sullivan. See New York Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 1961);
Brief for Petitioner at 88-90, 6 Record, New York Times.
42. See Commissioners Sue Newspaper, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 20, 1960, reprinted
[Vol. 33:741
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On May 30, 1960, Alabama Governor John Patterson filed a similar suit
against the Times, the four Alabama ministers, and Dr. King asking for
one million dollars in damages. 3 The suit filed by Sullivan was tried first
in November 1960, and after an appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court,"
was argued before the United States Supreme Court in January 1964 and
decided the following March. 5 In January 1961, the suit filed by Earl James
was tried before a jury in Montgomery and resulted in a verdict of $500,000
for James.16 The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the New
York Times case, however, was equally applicable to the fact situation in
the James case and, in effect, reversed it as well. 7
There was little the four Alabama ministers could do about the city com-
missioners' choice of the Montgomery County Circuit Court as a forum
because the ministers were Alabama residents. The Times, however, was a
New York corporation and could argue that, on the basis of diversity jurisdic-
tion, the suits against it should be heard in federal court." The principal
barrier to this argument was the joinder of the four Alabama ministers with
the Times as co-defendents. Under the federal removal statute, 9 diversity
cases are removable to federal court only if "none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought." 5 The city commissioners attempted to prevent the
Times from taking advantage of the removal provision by joining the four
Alabama ministers and alleging that they were "parties in interest."'"
in 5 Record at 2003, New York Times, City Officials Sue N. Y. Times, Alabama Journal, Apr.
20, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2141, New York Times.
43. See Five Negroes, Times Sued By Patterson, Montgomery Advertiser, May 31, 1960,
reprinted in 5 Record at 2030, New York Times; Patterson Files Suit: Claims Libel of Million,
Alabama Journal, May 30, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2160, New York Times.
44. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
45. New York Times, 376 U.S.at 254.
46. For accounts of the James trial, see Montgomery Advertiser, Feb. 2, 1961, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2114, New York Times, Montgormery Advertiser, Feb. 1, 1961, reprinted in
5 Record at 2118, New York Times; Witnesses Feel James Target of Ad In Times, Montgomery
Advertiser, Jan. 31, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2103, New York Times; Mayor's Suit Against
Times Opens Today, Montgomery Advertiser, Jan. 30, 1961, reprinted in 5 Record at 2102,
New York Times.
47. Because the jury verdict in the James case was never reviewed by an appellate court,
there is no written opinion in the case.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982) gives federal district courts original jurisdiction in civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000 and is between citizens of different states.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982) provides that,
[a]ny civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
State shrll be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the par-
ties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest
properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such
action is brought.
Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
19841
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In April 1961, after damages had been awarded by juries against the Times
in the both the New York Times and James cases, the Times succeeded in
removing the actions brought against it by Parks and Patterson. The actions
were removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.52 Parks and
Patterson, however, filed motions in the same court to remand their cases
to the Alabama state court." The basis of their motions was that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the cases because the Times's petition for
removal had not been filed in federal court within twenty days of the com-
mencement of the suits." In addition, Parks and Patterson contended that,
with the exception of Dr. King in Patterson's case, the four ministers were
Alabama residents and thus there was no diversity. 5 The Times argued that
it was a corporation organized under New York law and that the joinder
of the four Alabama defendants was fraudulent because it was done for
the sole purpose of preventing it from removing the case to federal court. 6
The Times claimed that the joinder was fraudulent because at the commence-
ment of the action there was no reasonable basis of liability under Alabama
law for the four Alabama defendants. 7 District court Judge Frank Johnson,
in upholding the removal to federal court, agreed with the Times and stated
that: "[N]o liability on the part of the four resident defendants existed under
any recognized theory of law .... The joinder in each of these cases therefore
was fraudulent as that term is used in removal cases. ' ' 8
Parks and Patterson appealed Judge Johnson's decision to uphold removal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appellate
court, by a two to one vote, reversed Judge Johnson. 9 Writing for the
52. Parks v. New York Times Co., 195 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1961), rev'd, 308 F.2d
474 (5th Cir. 1962).
53. Id. at 921.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 921-22.
57. Id.
58. Id. Since the Montgomery County Circuit Court held in the New York Times and James
trials that there was sufficient evidence against the four Alabama ministers not only to make
them parties to the action in state court but also to hold them liable, Judge Johnson appeared
to have been prevented by Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), from reaching an opposite
conclusion. However, since the United States Supreme Court decision in King v. Order of United
Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948), decisions of nisi prius courts have
been entitled to "some weight" but are not controlling on a federal court. Id. at 161-62. Since
the question of the liability of the four Alabama ministers had, at that point, been decided
only by the Montgomery County Circuit Court, Judge Johnson was free to make his own
determination of the issue.
59. Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962). The appeal in the case
was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) which provides that,
[wihen a district judge, in making in a civil action, an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order idvolves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
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majority, Judge Griffin Bell reviewed the substance of the claims by Parks
and Patterson against the Alabama residents. He gave considerable weight
to the fact that the trial courts in the New York Times and James cases
had permitted the question of the ministers' liability to go to the jury. Judge
Bell wrote:
A claim of fraudulent joinder must be pleaded with particularity, and
supported by clear and convincing evidence ...
[ . . IT]here can be no fraudulent joinder unless it be clear that there
can be no recovery under the law of the state on the cause alleged, or
on the facts in view of the law as they exist when the petition to remand
is heard.6"
Although the court of appeals reversed and remanded the cases, 6' the Parks
and Patterson suits were effectively nullified by the United States Supreme
Court decision in the New York Times case.
C. Suits Filed in Federal Court
As a result of Harrison Salisbury's article in the Times, in addition to
the four suits filed in Alabama state courts, seven suits were filed in
Birmingham in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama. On May 7, 1960, the three city commissioners of Birmingham,
James W. Morgan, Eugene Conner, and J. T. Waggoner, individually filed
suit against the Times and Salisbury seeking $500,000 in damages. 62 On May
27, 1961, the three city commissioners of Bessemar, Jess Lanier, Raymond
Parsons, and Herman Thompson, each filed similar suits asking damages
of $500,000.63 On July 20, 1960, a Birmingham detective, Joe Lindsey, filed
suit against the same defendants for $100,000.6 Finally, five libel suits were
brought against the Columbia Broadcasting Company for its coverage of
the March 29th advertisement and April 12th article in the Times. Three
of these suits, each asking $500,000 in damages, were filed by the Birmingham
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court
of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from
such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay pro-
ceedings to the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or
a judge thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
60. 308 F.2d at 478.
61. Id. at 481.
62. See Suits Filed Against Times, Montgomery Advertiser, May 7, 1960, reprinted in 5
Record at 2026, New York Times.
63. See Montgomery Advertiser, June 1, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2035, New York
Times; 3 Officials of Birmingham File Times Suit, Alabama Journal, May 31, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2159, New York Times.
64. See Detective's Suit Charges Times, Montgomery Advertiser, July 20, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2041, New York Times; Birmingham Officer Sues N.Y. Times, Alabama Jour-
nal, July 20, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2168, New York Times.
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city commissioners in federal court in Birmingham." Two other suits, each
seeking $100,000 in damages, were filed in the Montgomery federal court
by two members of the Board of Registers.66
Soon after these seven suits were filed, the Times and Salisbury moved
to quash service of process in Alabama which had been made under the
Alabama substituted service statute.67 Federal district court Judge Harlan
Grooms consolidated the seven actions for hearing on this motion. In an
unreported opinion, he upheld service based on the Alabama "long-arm"
statute.
6
An interlocutory appeal was then taken to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 69 The Times and Salisbury argued that
substituted service was not authorized under the Alabama statute because
the cause of action alleged did not arise from the defendants' activities in
Alabama.7" They also alleged that if the Alabama statute was applied to
them, it would violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
by interfering with freedom of the press and thus would abridge the rights
of citizens guaranteed under the first amendment.7 '
Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle, writing for an unanimous court, reversed the
district court and held that under the Alabama "long-arm" statute, service
was improper because of the requirement that "the cause of action must
have accrued . . . from some business or service performed in Alabama
or from some act incidental to the performance of such business or service
there." 72 Judge Tuttle wrote that under Alabama law, libel constitutes a cause
65. The three suits filed in federal court in Birmingham were brought by the three city
commissioners of Birmingham, Eugene Conner, J.D. Waggoner, and James W. Morgan.
66. The two suits filed in federal court in Montgomery were brought by Samuela Willis
and George Penton, members of the Board of Registers. A stipulation of the parties for dismissal
resulted in the complaints being dismissed with prejudice in December 1963.
During the period of the New York Times litigation, other defamation cases arising out of
the black civil rights movement were also before the courts. See Associated Press v. Walker,
39 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App. 1965), rev'd, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Walker case arose out of
the Associated Press's reporting of rioting on the University of Mississippi campus when James
Meredith, a black, sought entry to the University on September 30, 1962. 388 U.S. at 140.
Walker, a retired general, was described by the Associated Press as having taken command
of the crowd and as having led a charge by students on federal marshals sent to gain Meredith's
admission and to preserve order. Id. Walker filed suit claiming that the Associated Press coverage
was libelous, and sought $2,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
67. The decision of the district court on this motion is unreported. For a brief discussion
of it, see New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1966) and New
York Times v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492, 493 (5th Cir. 1961).
68. See U.S. Judge Deals Times Legal Blow, Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 3, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2048, New York Times.
69. See New York Times Co. v. Conner, 291 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1961). The basis of this
appeal was 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982). For the text of this section, see supra note 59. See
also Times Appeals Ruling Allowing Alabama Suits, Montgomery Advertiser, Sept. 10, 1960,
reprinted in 5 Record at 2062, New York Times (newspaper report of Times's appeal).
70. 291 F.2d at 494.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 496.
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of action only where publication occurred.7 3 In this case, the cause of action
did not arise in Alabama because Salisbury's article was published in New
York. Furthermore, the article was not "incident to" the five days Salisbury
spent in Alabama collecting material for the article.7" Judge Tuttle did not
reach the constitutional question raised by the Times and Salisbury, stating
only that "were we to construe the statute differently the court would be
faced with a serious constitutional question." 75
The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court with direc-
tions to enter a judgment for the defendants on the motion to quash the
service of process.76 The district court, however, continued the defendants'
motion to dismiss the case in order to give the plaintiffs time to amend
the complaint and to attempt new service." The plaintiffs then dropped their
actions against Salisbury and amended their complaints to allege a cause
of action arising out of the distribution of the Times in Alabama." Never-
theless, the district court held that this amendment was not legally sufficient
and dismissed the actions on the grounds that the amended complaints
presented "no new matter not heretofore ruled on, and embraced in the
appeal heretofore taken in this cause."7 9 Some of the plaintiffs then appealed
the dismissal to the court of appeals.8" Before the court of appeals had an
opportunity to consider this appeal, however, the Alabama Supreme Court
decided the appeal in the New York Times case8' and upheld service under
the Alabama "long-arm" statute. The Alabama Supreme Court stated: "It
is clear under our decisions that when a non-resident prints a libel beyond
the boundaries of the State, and distributes and publishes the libel in
Alabama, a cause of action arises in Alabama, as well as in the State of
the printing or publishing of the libel." 82
In response to the Alabama Supreme Court's decision, the Fifth Circuit
vacated its earlier decision quashing service of process.83 Judge Richard Rives,
writing for an unanimous court, stated that "[g]rave constitutional ques-
tions should not . . . be passed on on motions to dismiss when 'there is
a reasonable likelihood that production of evidence will make the question
clearer.""'8 Thus, the court remanded the case so that the constitutional ques-
tions raised by the parties could be decided after a trial on the merits.8"
By the time these cases came to trial in September 1964, Conner was the
73. Id. at 494.
74. Id. at 495-96.
75. Id. at 496.
76. Id.
77. New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1966).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 273 Ala. at 670, 144 So. 2d at 25.
82. Id.
83. Conner v. New York Times Co., 310 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir. 1962).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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only remaining plaintiff. During the trial, Conner sought to prove that four
statements made by Salisbury in his April 12, 1960 article were defamatory
of him. These were: first, that under Birmingham custom, persons charged
with vagrancy are not admitted to bail and are held incommunicado for
three days and that "this is a favorite technique" of Conner; second, that
Conner made a political comeback in 1958, "running on a platform of race
hate;" third, that Conner once said "[D]amn the law-down here we make
our own law;" and finally, that the Reverend Fred L. Shuttlesworth "has
been a frequent target of Mr. Conner's men. "86
After the jury returned a verdict in the case for Conner, awarding him
$40,000 in compensatory damages, the case came back before the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for the third time. 7 In its argument before
the court of appeals, the Times again raised the issue that jurisdiction based
on the Alabama "long-arm" statute violated due process and the first
amendment. 8 The Times also contended that there was insufficient evidence
to support a showing of "actual malice" as required by the Supreme Court
decision in New York Times.89 By a two to one vote, the court of appeals
reversed the decision of the district court.9"
In deciding whether the Times had "sufficient minimum contacts" with
Alabama to support the application of the state's substituted service statute,
Judge Homer Thornberry was faced with two apparently contradictory
holdings of the Fifth Circuit. In Buckley v. New York Times Co.,9 the court
of appeals held that the alleged commission of the tort of libel plus newspaper
circulation and advertising solicitation within Louisiana did not constitute
sufficient minimum contacts under the due process clause.92 In Elkhart
Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke,9" however, the Fifth Circuit held that
the tortious damage caused by a single airplane crash within Alabama fulfilled
the minimum contacts requirement. Judge Thornberry succeeded in "har-
monizing" these two positions by holding that "First Amendment considera-
tions surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing of contact to
satisfy the due process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over
other types of tortious activity." 9
On the issue of whether the evidence supported a finding of "actual
86. Conner, 365 F.2d at 573-74.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 569-73.
89. Id. at 569.
90. Id. at 577.
91. 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964).
92. Id. at 474. Judge Thornberry found that the contacts in Conner were "virtually iden-
tical" with those in Buckley. Conner, 365 F.2d at 570. In Buckley, the court of appeals said
that "mere circulation of a periodical through the mails to subscribers and independent
distributors" and "sporadic news gathering by reporters on special assignment and the soliticitation
of a small amount of advertising do not constitute doing business nor engaging in business
activity." Buckley, 338 F.2d at 474.
93. 343 F.2d 861, 868 (5th Cir. 1965).
94. Conner, 365 F.2d at 572.
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malice," Judge Thornberry considered the background of the allegedly
defamatory statements. According to the court, since Conner was "clearly
a public official," the case was governed by the Supreme Court's decision
in New York Times.9 5 Judge Thornberry thus held that Conner was pro-
hibited from recovering damages for defamatory statements unless he could
prove "actual malice." 96 The court found that the evidence presented by
Conner "[did] not even approach the stringent requirements for showing
actionable libel of a public official." 97 The court remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.
II. SULLIVAN V. NEW YORK TIMES
A. The Preliminaries
On April 19, 1960, the three city commissioners of Montgomery, Alabama,
individually filed suit in the Montgomery County Circuit Court against the
Times, Ralph Abernathy, Fred Shuttlesworth, S. S. Seay, Sr., and J. E.
Lowery.9" Each plaintiff asked for $500,000 in damages against the
defendants.9 9 The complaints filed by each of the city commissioners were
identical and were based on alleged defamatory statements in the third and
sixth paragraphs of the advertisement which had appeared in the Times on
March 29, 1960.00°
At the time the three Montgomery city commissioners filed their suits,
the Times had not qualified to do business in Alabama and had not
designated anyone to receive service of process there. Thus, the plaintiffs
relied on two sections of title seven of the Code of Alabama for service.
Section 188 of title seven provided for service upon a corporation by deliver-
95. Id. at 576.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Commissioners Sue Newspaper, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 20, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2003, New York Times; City Officials Sue N. Y. Times, Alabama Journal, Apr.
20, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2141, New York Times; supra text accompanying note 42.
Throughout the litigation, the three city commissioners were represented by the Montgomery
law firm of Steiner, Crum & Baker. See Transcript of Proceedings on Merits, 2 Record at
567, New York Times. The Times was represented by its New York counsel, the firm of Lord,
Day & Lord, which counted among its members former U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell
and William P. Rogers. Id. at 570. Although the Times had difficulty in finding local counsel
in Alabama, it was finally represented by a Birmingham firm, Beddow, Embry & Beddow,
which was prominent in criminal defense work. Id. at 568; see also Times Challenges Libel
Suit Here New York Newspaper Retains B'ham Firm of Bedlow, Embry, Beddow As Counsel,
Alabama Journal, May 20, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2156, New York Times (newspaper
account of the Times's retention of Birmingham counsel). Eric Embry, who represented the
Times before the Alabama courts, was later appointed to the Alabama Supreme Court.
99. See Commissioners Sue Newspaper, Montgomery Advertiser, Apr. 20, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2003, New York Times.
100. See City Officials Sue N.Y. Times, Alabama Journal, Apr. 20, 1960, reprinted in 5
Record at 2141, New York Times. For the text of the third and sixth paragraphs of the adver-
tisement, see supra text accompanying notes 16 and 19.
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ing a copy of the summons and complaint to any one of a number of dif-
ferent officers or employees of the corporation, including "any .. .agent
thereof."'' Using this section, the plaintiffs served Don McKee, a
"stringer"' 0 ' for the Times in Montgomery, claiming that he was an "agent"
for the purposes of section 188.103
In addition to service on an agent of the Times, service was also made
on the Alabama Secretary of State pursuant to Alabama's substituted ser-
vice statute.' 4 This statute provided that a nonresident who had not qualified
to do business in Alabama, but did business or performed work or services
in Alabama, would be deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State to
be his lawful agent.'0 ' Service could then be made upon the Secretaty of
State in any action arising out of the nonresident's business, work, or ser-
vices in Alabama.
The Times made no attempt to remove the New York Times and James
cases to federal court. The reason the Times did not raise the joinder issue
was articulated in Parks v. New York Times, "6 a case in which the Times
finally decided to raise the issue of fraudulent joinder. The Times argued
that it was not until after the New York Times and James cases that it became
clear that the plaintiffs had no reasonable theory of liability upon which
to base their claims against the four Alabama ministers.'10 Thus, the Times
said, it had no way of knowing how tenuous the claims were until these
cases were heard.
B. Pretrial Strategy
When the Times received the complaints filed by the three Montgomery
city commissioners, it made a special appearance' 0 to move to quash the
101. Section 188 of title seven of the Alabama Code provided:
When an action at law is against a corporation the summons may be executed by
the delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to the president, or other
head thereof, secretary, cashier, station agent or any other agent thereof. The return
of the officer executing the summons that the person to whom delivered is the
agent of the corporation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact and authorize
judgment by default or otherwise without further proof of such agency and this
fact need not be recited in the judgment entry.
ALA. CODE tit. 7 § 188 (1960).
102. During the hearing on the Times's motion to quash service, Harold Faber, the National
News Editor of the Times, defined a "stringer" as "a person who works for another newspaper
or news agency upon whom we call for news occasionally or who calls us to offer news occa-
sionally." See Transcript of Proceedings on Motion to Quash, I Record at 136, New York Times.
103. See Motion to Quash Service of Process, I Record at 39-40, New York Times.
104. See supra note 40.
105. See id.
106. 195 F. Supp. 919 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
107. Id. at 922.
108. Prior to the federal rules, the practice was to appear specially to challenge the jurisdic-
tion of the court. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1344
(1969). In federal court it is no longer necessary to make a special appearance to challenge
personal jurisdiction. Id.
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service of process on the grounds that the Montgomery Circuit Court lacked
both personal jurisdiction over the Times and subject matter jurisdiction over
the action. ,09
Prior to hearing arguments on the motion, Judge Walter B. Jones ordered
the Times to produce books, documents, back issues, telegrams, and letters
from its Alabama correspondents to help determine whether it was doing
business in the state. '" The Times filed a petition of mandamus to the
Alabama Supreme Court challenging this order and asking that it be set
aside. The court however, denied the petition."'
A three day hearing was held before Judge Jones on the motion to quash
during which the Times presented two arguments." 2 First, the Times argued
that the Alabama substituted service statute was not applicable to the case
because even though the Times was a nonresident corporation, it was not
doing business in Alabama." 3 The Times supported its position by showing
that it had no office, property, or employees located in Alabama. Its staff
did visit the state occasionally for the purpose of news gathering, but it relied
principally on "stringers" who sent in stories and received payment only
if they were used.'" The Times further maintained that both its circulation
and advertising revenue in Alabama were negligible. Of the 650,000 daily
copies of the Times, 394 were sent to Alabama and only thirty-five of these
went to Montgomery County.' 5 Of the 1,300,000 copies of the Sunday Times,
109. See Motion to Quash Service of Process, 1 Record at 39, New York Times; Amend-
ment to Motion to Quash Service of Process, I Record at 47, New York Times. For newspaper
accounts of this event, see Times Asks Court To Quash Damage Suits, Montgomery Adver-
tiser, May 21, 1960 reprinted in 5 Record at 2017, New York Times; Times Challenges Libel
Suit Here, Alabama Journal, May 20, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2156, New York Times.
110. See Times Told To Show Record, Alabama Journal, June 30, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record
at 2161, New York Times.
111. N. Y. Times Loses In Move To Have Records Closeted, Montgomery Advertiser, July
1, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2033, New York Times.
112. See Transcript of Proceedings on Motion to Quash, I Record at 130-486, 2 Record
at 487-567, New York Times. For newspaper accounts of this event, see Jones Hears Arguments
in N.Y. Times Suit, Alabama Journal, Aug. 1, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2176, New
York Times; Times Suit Ends, Arguments Set, Montgomery Advertiser, July 28, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2038, New York Times, Important Precedent At Stake In "Times" Case before
Judge Jones, Alabama Journal, July 28 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2173, New York Times;
Lawyers Add To Documents In Libel Suit, Montgomery Advertiser, July 27, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2035, New York Times; Times Hearing on Libel Suit In Third Day, Alabama
Journal, July 27, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2172, New York Times; Tempers Flare at
"Times" Hearing, Alabama Journal, July 27, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2178, New York
Times; 200 Times Stories About Alabama Put Into Evidence In Court, Alabama Journal, July
26, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2170, New York Times; State Has No Jurisdiction in Libel
Suit, "Times" Says, Alabama Journal, July 25, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2169, New
York Times.
113. See Attorneys Contend N. Y. Times Didn't Do Business In State, Montgomery Adver-
tiser, July 26, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2041, New York Times.
114. See Testimony of Harold Faber, National News Editor of the Times, in Transcript of
Proceedings on Motion to Quash, I Record at 136-47, New York Times.
115. See Colloquy re and Introduction of Exhibits, Transcript of Proceedings on Merits,
2 Record at 601-02, New York Times.
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only 2,455 went to Alabama. '6 The Times also presented testimony that
of its total advertising revenue of $37,500,000 for the first six months of
1960, only $18,000 came from Alabama. ' 7 The second argument made by
the Times was constitutional in nature: If the court asserted jurisdiction under
the substituted service statute, the lack of sufficient minimum contacts would
deny the Times due process, violating the first, fifth, and fourteenth
amendments.III
Judge Jones denied the motion to quash.' '9 He stated that although the
motion papers filed by the Times purported to constitute a "special
appearance for the sole purpose of quashing service of process," one of
the grounds of the prayer of the motion was a request to "dismiss this action
as to the New York Times . . . for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of said action."' 2 ° Judge Jones found that this went beyond the ques-
tion of personal jurisdiction over the Times and constituted a general
appearance.' 2 He said that the Times could not assert that it was before
the court solely on a question of personal jurisdiction and, "in the same
breath," argue that "this Court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the action."' 2 2 Judge Jones said that "a party's appearance in a suit for
any other purpose other than to contest the Court's jurisdiction over the
person of such a party, is a general appearance." '23
After holding that the Times had made a general appearance and waived
its special appearance, Judge Jones stated that the Times "was amenable
to process and suit in Alabama courts regardless of its general appearance." 1
2
4
He found that the Times was doing business in Alabama based on "an
extensive and continuous course of Alabama business activity-news gather-
ing; solicitation of advertising; circulation of newspapers and other
products.""'2 In such a case, Judge Jones said, due process did not require
that the cause of action arise out of business done in Alabama.' 26
116. New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1966).
117. See Testimony of Joseph B. Wagner, National Advertising Manager of the Times,
Transcript of Proceedings on Motion to Quash, 1 Record at 330, New York Times.
118. See Statement of Eric Embry, attorney for the Times, Transcript of Proceedings on
Motion to Quash, I Record at 462-64, New York Times.
119. See Order And Opinion On Motion To Quash, I Record at 49, New York Times. For
newspaper accounts of this ruling, see Judge Rules Times Suit Legal Here, Montgomery Adver-
tiser, Aug. 6, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2043, New York Times; N.Y. Times Can Be
Sued Here, Alabama Journal, Aug. 6, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2179, New York Times.
120. See Order and Opinion on Motion to Quash, I Record at 49, New York Times.
121. Id. at 51.
122. Id. at 49.
123. Id. at 50.
124. Id. at 51.
125. Id. at 56.
126. Id. at 55.
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C. The Trial
1. Publicity and the Trial Environment
The jury trial in New York Times began on November 1, 1960, and lasted
for three days.' 27 Neither the pre-trial publicity nor the courtroom environ-
ment were favorable to the Times or the four ministers. The case was tried
before Judge Walter B. Jones and an all white jury chosen from Montgomery
County.' 28
Newspaper articles which were critical of the defendants and of the March
29, 1960 advertisement in the Times appeared in local papers prior to and
during the trial of the case.' 29 In an April 9, 1960 article entitled "Not The
First Lie About South," the Alabama Journal declared:
It must be very disappointing to regular readers of the New York Times,
one of the world's really great newspapers, to find it has been willing
to lend its columns for such a page of falsehood as that published the
other day and signed by money-beggars who want to defend such a
despicable character as Martin Luther King in the courts and save him
from the penalties of his derelictions.' 3 °
The April 18, 1960 edition of the same paper was even more vituperative
regarding the advertisement. It stated:
[The New York Times'] full page advertisement signed by Eleanor
Roosevelt, Ralph Abernathy et al, to raise $200,000 for M. L. King to
defend himself against income tax fraud in Alabama is a pack of lies from
beginning to end. Without some sinister purpose, no newspaper would
print such libelous and scandalous material without confirming its
contents."'
On September 25, 1960, a writer for the Montgomery Advertiser expressed
sentiments which must have concerned the Times when he reported: "State
and City authorities have found a formidable legal bludgeon to swing at
out-of-state newspapers whose reporters cover racial incidents in Alabama." 32
The courtroom atmosphere became an issue as the trial progressed and
was raised again in the appeals filed by the four ministers and in their briefs
and arguments before the Supreme Court. The black ministers argued that
127. The Transcript of the jury trial in New York Times is reprinted in 2 Record at 567-862,
New York Times.
128. The case was tried to a jury of 12 white men. The jury was chosen from a panel of
36, including two blacks. The blacks, however, were stricken by Sullivan's counsel. See Lawyers
Clash at Times Trial, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1960, at 33, col. 1.
129. See supra note 30.
130. Not First Lie About South, Alabama Journal, Apr. 9, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record
at 2134, New York Times.
131. Unworthy Newspaper Policy, Alabama Journal, Apr. 18, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record
at 2139, New York Times.
132. State Finds Formidable Legal Club To Swing At Out-Of-Sate Press, Montgomery Adver-
tiser, Sept. 25, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record at 2064, New York Times.
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their rights to equal protection, due process, and a fair and impartial trial
under the fourteenth amendment had been violated.' 33 A recitation of some
of the facts contained in the record and the Supreme Court briefs will give
an indication of the trial environment.
The media focused attention on the jurors and made certain that their
identities were known to the Montgomery populace. Photographers in the
courtroom took pictures of all the jurors for Montgomery's two local
newspapers, and television cameras followed the juries to the door of the
jury room.' 34 The names of the jurors were printed by the Montgomery
newspapers; one paper reported the names on its front page.'
35
Judge Jones made his feelings on segregation and his beliefs concerning
the Constitution clear in a statement from the bench in a companion case
to New York Times. In the action brought by Montgomery Mayor Earl James
against the Times and the four ministers based on the March 29th advertise-
ment, Judge Jones stated in open court: "[T]here will be no integrated seating
in this courtroom. Spectators will be seated in this courtroom according to
their race, and this for the orderly administration of justice and the good
of all people coming here lawfully."' 3' He then turned his thoughts to the
fourteenth amendment:
Much has been said at the Bar, and out of the hearing of the trial jury,
as to the supposed requirements of the XIV Amendment directing the Trial
Judge of the Court of a soverign state how he will conduct a trial before
a jury in the courts of Alabama.
I would like to say for those here present, and for those who may come
here to litigate in the future, that the XIV Amendment has no standing
whatsoever in this Court, it is a pariah and an outcast, if it be construed
to hold and direct the Presiding Judge of this Court as to the manner
in which proceedings in the court . . . shall be conducted.
The judge presiding here today knows that it is quite the fashion in
high judicial place to work the XIV Amendment overtime, to put it above
every other part of the Constitution, and to deliberately forget and neglect
the more important parts of the federal constitution ....
We will now continue with the trial of this case under the laws of the
State of Alabama, and not under the XIV Amendment, and in the belief
and knowledge that the white man's justice, . . . will give the parties at
the Bar of this Court, regrardless of race or color, equal justice under
law.13 7
133. Brief For The Petitioners at 52-62, Abernathy v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), 6 Record,
New York Times.
134. The photographs of the jurors, published in the Alabama Journal, are reprinted in 2
Record at 951, 955, New York Times. See also Transcript of Proceedings on Defendant's,
The New York Times Company, Motion for a New Trial, 2 Record at 889-90, New York
Times (pictures offered into evidence during proceedings on motion for new trial).
135. Jurors Selected For Times Suit, Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. I, 1960, reprinted in
5 Record at 2079-80, New York Times.
136. Jones, Court Room Segregation, 22 ALA. LAWYER 190, 191 (1961); Courtroom Segregated
in Times Suit, Alabama Journal, Feb. 1, 1961, reprinted in 5 Record at 2213, New York Times.
137. Jones, supra note 136, at 191-92.
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Judge Jones's sentiments were also apparent from the manner in which he
addressed the various trial lawyers. When he questioned prospective jurors
concerning their knowledge of, or relationship with, the attorneys trying the
case, he referred to the attorneys for Sullivan and the Times as "Mister,"
but dispensed with this title when he made reference to the ministers' black
lawyers.' The Judge spoke of the black attorneys as "Fred Gray of
Montgomery" or "V. Z. Crawford of Mobile." 3 9 The trial transcript fur-
ther reflects different forms of identification for the lawyers, with the black
attorneys being referred to as "Lawyer Gray" or "Lawyer Crawford" while
the white attorneys were referred to as "Mister."'""
On one occasion, Sullivan's counsel, while reading a portion of the March
29th advertisement, mispronounced the word "negro" as "nigra" and
"nigger" in the presence of the jury and without admonition by the court.''
Furthermore, in his summation, Sullivan's counsel declared: "In other words,
all of these things that happened did not happen in Russia where the police
run everything, they did not happen in the Congo where they still eat them,
they happened in Montgomery, Alabama, a law-abiding community."' 2
Again no rebuke was made by Judge Jones for that statement.'4 3
2. Plaintiff's Case
The basis of Sullivan's case was the allegation that the third and sixth
paragraphs of the March 29th advertisement, "Heed Their Rising Voices,"
were defamatory to him.'" As to the third paragraph, dealing with a series
of events which occured at Alabama State College, Sullivan introduced
evidence to show that although police were stationed near the campus on
three occasions, they did not "ring" the campus; that student leaders were
not expelled for singing on the Capitol steps but rather for their participa-
tion in lunch-counter sit-ins; that less than the "entire student body" pro-
tested by not re-registering; and that the dining hall had not been padlocked
in an effort to starve the students into submission.' 4 5 Sullivan also contended
that the sixth paragraph was defamatory because Dr. King had been arrested
four times instead of seven times and because the police were not responsible
for the assaults or bombings against Dr. King.' 4 6
138. Transcript of Proceedings on Merits, 2 Record at 568, New York Times.
139. Id.
140. Id. passim.
141. Id. at 579-80.
142. Id. at 930 (emphasis added).
143. Another example of the discriminatory trial atmosphere was the fact that during the
trial, the court was adjourned on the day that "Court Square" was renamed "Confederate
Square" in conjunction with the celebration of the Civil War centennial. See Delay is Denied
in Times Trial, Alabama Journal, Jan. 30, 1961, reprinted in 5 Record at 2221, New York Times.
144. See Times' Libel Suit Opens Today, Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. 1, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2077, New York Times.
145. See L.B. Sullivan Testifies in Times Suit, Alabama Journal, Nov. 2, 1960, reprinted
in 5 Record at 2203, New York Times.
146. Id.
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In addition to establishing that the statements in the two paragraphs were
incorrect, Sullivan presented testimony that the statements referred to him.' 7
Sullivan called six witnesses who testified that the actions in the two
paragraphs would tend to be associated with the city commissioners generally
and with Sullivan in particular.' 8 The six witnesses testified that if they had
believed the statements in the advertisement regarding the police department's
actions, they would have thought that Sullivan was improperly carrying out
the duties of his office and would have believed that the police were guilty
of serious misbehavior.'"9 None of the six witnesses, however, testified that
he believed the advertisement.
3. Defendants' Case
The Times based its defense on three arguments. First, since neither Sullivan
nor any of the Montgomery city commissioners were mentioned by name,
Sullivan had not met his burden of proving that the advertisement paragraphs
published were "of or concerning" him.' 50 Second, although Sullivan had
responsibility for supervision of the Montgomery Police Department, he was
normally not responsible for the day-to-day operations of the department,
including those during the demonstrations at Alabama State College.' 5'
Because all of these operations were under the supervision of the Montgomery
Chief of Police, Sullivan did not show that the advertisement charged him
with any misconduct in office.' 52 Finally, even if the jury found that the
allegedly defamatory matter referred to Sullivan, the Times maintained that
it did not publish the advertisement maliciously and thus was not liable.' 3
147. The basis of Sullivan's claim was the "feeling" that the advertisement "reflects not
only on me but on the other Commissioners and the community." Testimony of L.B. Sullivan,
Transcript of Proceedings on Merits, 2 Record at 724, New York Times. Sullivan felt that
the statements referring to "police activities," or "police action" were associated with him,
impugned his "ability and integrity" and reflected on him "as an individual." Id. at 712,
713, 724. He also claimed that the statements in the advertisement which alluded to the bomb-
ing of Dr. King's home referred to the commissioners, to the police department and to him
because they were contained in the same paragraph as the statements mentioning police activities.
Id. at 717-18.
148. See Transcript of Proceedings on Merits, 2 Record at 602-52, New York Times; Witnesses
Say Ad Reflected on Sullivan, Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. 2, 1960, reprinted in 5 Record
at 2081, New York Times. The witnesses called by Sullivan were Grover C. Hall, the editor
of the Montgomery Advertiser; Arnold D. Blackwell, a member of the Water Works Board
appointed by the commissioner and a businessman engaged in real estate and insurance; Harry
W. Kaminsky, the sales manager of a clothing store and a close friend of Sullivan; H.M. Price,
Sr., the owner of a small food equipment business; William M. Parker, Jr., a service station
owner who was a friend of Sullivan; and Horace W. White, the owner of a trucking company
and a former employer of Sullivan. 2 Record at 602-69, New York Times.
149. See Witnesses Say Ad Reflected on Sullivan, Montgomery Advertiser, Nov. 2, 1960,
reprinted in 5 Record at 2081, 2084, New York Times.
150. See Oral Charge and Exceptions Thereto, 2 Record at 821-22, 829-36, New York Times.
151. See Testimony of L.B. Sullivan, Transcript of Proceedings on Merits, 2 Record at 703,
720, New York Times.
152. See Oral Charge and Exceptions Thereto, 2 Record at 834, New York Times.
153. Id. at 836.
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Although joined as co-defendants with the Times, the defensive strategy
of the four Alabama ministers was to separate themselves from the substan-
tive question of whether the advertisement was defamatory. Leaving that
issue to the Times, the ministers completely disassociated themselves from
the advertisement by maintaining that they did not sign it, were not members
of the committee which published it, were never approached by the commit-
tee for permission to use their names, and did not even know that the adver-
tisement was being published.' 4
4. The Trial Court Decision
In his charge to the jury, Judge Jones stated that the third and sixth
paragraphs of the advertisement were "libelous per se," ' " and withdrew from
the jury the question of whether the text was defamatory.' 56 He instructed
the jury that "general damages need not be alleged or proved but are
presumed,""' 7 and that Sullivan was entitled to recover both "presumed"
and punitive damages if the jury decided that the words referred to him." '
Although Judge Jones held that no actual damages had to be proved, under
Alabama law punitive damages could not be claimed unless a retraction had
been requested and refused.' 9 Because Sullivan had written to the Times
and the other defendants requesting a retraction, and because the retraction
was not immediately given, the court allowed the jury to assess punitive
damages.6'
After only two hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict for
Sullivan in the amount of $500,000. ,6 The amount was not specified as either
actual or punitive damages.' 62 The Times immediately filed a motion for
a new trial based on alleged errors made by the trial court and on the ground
that the excessive verdict violated the Constitution.'6 3 In addition, the four
ministers claimed that they did not receive a fair trial and that this violated
both the Alabama and federal Constitutions.'64 Judge Jones denied the
Times's motion. Further, he stated that the four ministers had allowed the
time for their motions for a new trial to lapse and thus he could not con-
sider them.' 6'
154. See Transcript of Proceedings on Merits, 2 Record at 787-804, New York Times.
155. See Oral Charge and Exceptions Thereto, 2 Record at 819, 823-24, New York Times.
156. Id. at 824.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 825.
159. Id. at 821.
160. Id. at 821, 824-26.
161. See Final Judgment, Jury and Verdict, 2 Record at 862, New York Times.
162. Id.
163. Motion of Defendant, The New York Times Co., for New Trial, 2 Record at 896,
New York Times.
164. Motion of Defendant, Ralph D. Abernathy, For New Trial, 2 Record at 970, New York
Times.
165. Order of Court Denying Motion of New York Times Co. for A New Trial, 2 Record
at 970, New York Times. In order to stay the execution of the trial court's judgment to allow
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1II. NEW YORK TIMES Co. V. SULLIVAN
A. The Alabama Supreme Court
When the federal courts declined to review the Montgomery County Cir-
cuit Court decision in New York Times via a collateral injunctive action,
the only alternative for the Times and the four Alabama ministers was a
direct appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court. In August 1962, that court
handed down its decision, upholding the circuit court as to its jurisdiction,
the merits of the case, and the amount of the damages. '
In the Alabama Supreme Court, the Times again raised the issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The court, however, held that the activities of the Times's
stringers in Alabama, the revenue realized by the newspaper from Alabama
advertisers, and its circulation in the state were "amply sufficient to more
than meet the minimal standards required for service upon its representative"
under section 188.617 In addition, the court upheld substituted service on
for an appeal to the Alabama Supreme court, the four Alabama ministers were required under
Alabama law to post "supersedeas bonds" of $500,000, which they were financially unable
to do. See Abernathy v. Patterson, 295 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
986 (1962). When the state began levying on their property to satisfy the judgment, the four
ministers filed a complaint in federal district court seeking injunctive relief. Id. The basis of
their motion was 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4) which provides that
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States;
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)-(4) (1982). The complaint was directed not only to Sullivan but to the
suits filed by the other city commissioners and the suit brought by Alabama Governor John
Patterson. Since the request was for equitable relief, the ministers alleged they would suffer
irreparable harm and that they had no adequate relief at law. Abernathy, 295 F.2d at 454-55.
On the same day the ministers filed their federal court action, they also moved for a preliminary
injunction to prevent the levy upon and sale of their property in satisfaction of the $500,000
judgments. Id. at 455. District court Judge Frank Johnson denied the request for the preliminary
injunction on the grounds that the ministers had failed to seek any relief from the Circuit
Court of Montgomery County or from any of the defendants. Id. When the defendants then
filed a motion to dismiss the injunction action, Judge Johnson granted it in an unreported
decision. Id. at 456.
The dismissal was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit where
Judge Rives, writing for an unanimous court, upheld the dismissal on the grounds that if plain-
tiffs felt their constitutional rights were not adequately protected in the state courts of Alabama,
they could appeal the case to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 457-58. Rather than
wait for the Alabama Supreme Court to decide their appeal in the New York Times case,
the ministers sought review of the court of appeals's dismissal by a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The petition was denied without comment. Abernathy
v. Patterson, 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
166. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 273 Ala. 670, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
167. Id. at 669, 144 So. 2d at 29-33.
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the Alabama Secretary of State under section 199(1).68 The court concluded
not only that a cause of action arose in Alabama from printing a libelous
statement in New York and distributing it in Alabama, but also that the
solicitation of advertising and circulation of the newspaper in the state con-
stituted doing business or performing services for purposes of section 199(1).169
Finally, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld Judge Jones's refusal to quash
service of process for lack of personal jurisdiction, agreeing with Judge
Jones's holding that the Times's motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction constituted a general appearance. '7
In addition to the question of jurisdiction, the Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's holding on the merits of the case. The court stated
that where "the words published tend to injure a person libeled by them
in his reputation, profession, trade or business, or charge him with an
indictable offense, or tends to bring the individual into public contempt,"
they are "libelous per se.''. The court then applied this test to the third
and sixth paragraphs of the advertisement and found "the matter complained
of is, under the above doctrine, libelous per se, if it was published of and
concerning plaintiff."' 72 As to the Times's argument that there was
insufficient evidence to connect the statements with Sullivan, the Alabama
Supreme Court stated:
We think it common knowledge that the average person knows that
municipal agents, such as police and firemen, and others, are under the
control and direction of the city governing body, and more particularly
under the direction and control of a single commissioner. In measuring
the performance or deficiencies of such groups, praise or criticism is usually
attached to the official in complete control of the body.'73
The Alabama Supreme Court then summarily dismissed the Times's remain-
ing constitutional arguments on the grounds that "the First Amendment .
. .does not protect libelous publications" and "the Fourteenth Amendment
is directed against State action and not private action."' 74
On the question of the award of damages, the Alabama Supreme Court
first held that, since the jury found that the words referred to Sullivan, he
was entitled to recover without "proof of pecuniary injury . . . .such injury
being implied."' 75 In reply to the Times's argument that the amount of
damages was excessive, the court found that the New York Times "in its
own files had articles already published which would have demonstrated the
falsity of the allegations in the advertisement."' 7 6 Since the newspaper did
168. Id.
169. Id. at 669-70, 144 So. 2d at 33-35.
170. Id. at 671, 144 So. 2d at 35.
171. Id. at 673, 144 So. 2d at 37.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 674-75, 144 So. 2d at 39.
174. Id. at 676, 144 So. 2d at 40.
175. Id. at 676, 144 So. 2d at 41.
176. Id. at 686, 144 So. 2d at 50.
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not retract the statements as to Sullivan when requested to do so and did
not deny the falsity of the advertisement at the trial, the court concluded
that "the jury could not have but been impressed with the bad faith of
the Times, and its maliciousness inferable therefrom." ' 77
The Alabama Supreme Court's decision was not unexpected. But while
the decision went against the Times it was tactically favorable because, in
upholding the trial court on every ground, it made a successful challenge
in the United States Supreme Court possible.
B. Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
The initial question faced by the Times in deciding how to prepare its
case for review by the United States Supreme Court was whether to base
its arguments on the substantive law of libel or the procedural issues of the
Alabama court's jurisdiction over the Times. An appeal to the United States
Supreme Court can be made when a state court upholds a state statute against
a constitutional challenge.' 78 If the jurisdictional question was to be the basis
of review, the approach would be by appeal since the argument would be
that the application of the Alabama statutes was unconstitutional. Review
by writ of certiorari is available where a state statute is challenged on con-
stitutional grounds or where a right is claimed under the Constitution.' 79
If the Times was to base its argument on the Alabama courts' application
of the law of libel, the approach would be by certiorari. Even though a
state statute was not under challenge, the interpretation of the law of libel
in this case conflicted with a first amendment right claimed under the
Constitution.' 80 The decision to make the libel question the central thrust
of the case was made by Columbia University Law School Professor Herbert
Wechsler, the principal draftsman of the petition for certiorari for the Times
and the Times's counsel in oral argument before the Supreme Court.
177. Id. at 686, 144 So. 2d at 51.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982) provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state
on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity.
Id.
179. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3) (1982) provides that a final judgment of the highest court of a
state may be reviewed by the Supreme Court:
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United
States is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws
of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially
set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission
held or authority exercised under, the United States.
Id.
180. Id.
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Counsel began the petition for writ of certiorari with the argument that
the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court violated the first amendment
by construing the law of libel in a manner that was overly restrictive of
the right to protest and criticize public officials. ' The Times stated that
by relying on a "common law concept of the most general and undefined
nature,'''n the Alabama court made criticism of public officials
indistinguishable from seditious libel, which the court had long held violated
the first amendment.' 83 According to the Times, speech should only be
punished when there is a "clear and present danger of perversion of the
course of justice.""'8 These grounds were not present, according to the Times,
when a person based his claim solely on damage to reputation.' 85
The Times went on to maintain that even if freedom of the press could
be constitutionally subordinated to the protection of reputation, the evidence
in this case did not establish injury, or even threat of injury, to Sullivan's
reputation that would provide an interest greater than the first amendment.'"
While admitting that there were exaggerations and inaccuracies in the adver-
tisement, the Times claimed that "these statements cannot rationally be
regarded as tending to injure the respondent's reputation."'", As to the
declaration by the Alabama Supreme Court that "the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is directed against State action not private action," the Times asserted
that this was not private action since the Times was challenging a state rule
of law applied by a state court to a judgment.'88
Even though the Times stressed the constitutional issues involved in the
application of the law of libel, it also attacked the Alabama courts' assump-
tion of jurisdiction. The Times challenged the trial court's dismissal of its
motion to quash, arguing that the motion raised only the issue of personal
jurisdiction.' 89 The Times maintained that its "peripheral relationship" to
Alabama did not involve "continuous corporate operations" which were so
"substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of
action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.""'9 In
addition, the Times argued that the Alabama court did not have in per-
sonam jurisdiction based on the service of process.' 9 ' Finally, the Times raised
the issue of primary concern to the newspapers: that the assumption of
jurisdiction in such cases would place a burden on interstate commerce pro-
181. Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To The Supreme Court Of Alabama at 12, 6 Record,
New York Times.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 12-13.
184. Id. at 14.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 16.
187. Id. at 17.
188. Id. at 20-21.
189. Id. at 21-24.
190. Id. at 24-25.
191. Id. at 24-29.
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hibited by the commerce clause.' 92 The Times argued that if minuscule state
circulation of a paper published in another state was sufficient to establish
jurisdiction, newspapers would limit distribution and correspondents would
be inhibited from inter-state travel.' 93
In the opposing brief for the respondent, counsel for Sullivan began by
arguing that the Times did not have a constitutional privilege to defame
an elected city official in a paid newspaper advertisement. According to
Sullivan, the Times "knew that the charges were uninvestigated and reckless
in the extreme" and did not plead truth, fair comment, or privilege at trial,
thus precluding the issue on appeal.' 9 Sullivan further maintained that neither
libel nor commercial advertisements were constitutionally protected free
speech.' 9
Sullivan also disputed the Times's contention that a federal question was
presented "because the jury was wrong in finding that the advertisement
was 'of and concerning' respondent; and, because, even if the reference were
sufficient, 'the whole libel rests on two discrepencies' which are mere 'exag-
gerations or inaccuracies."'' 9' Since the case had been tried before a jury
"according to admittedly proper court procedure," Sullivan argued that the
United States Supreme Court could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to
review jury verdicts affirmed by a state supreme court.' 97
Finally, Sullivan contended that the Times's news gathering activities,
solicitation of advertising, and distribution of newspapers in Alabama were
incident to the cause of action for libel and were sufficient contacts with
the state to give the trial court personal jurisdiction.' 8 Sullivan dismissed
the Times's concern about the effect of the jury verdict on the commerce
clause by pointing out that none of the cases cited by the Times were decided
after 1932 and therefore did not address the expanded scope of jurisdiction
over foreign corporations granted by the Supreme Court since that time.' 99
In their petition for a writ of certiorari, the four Alabama ministers raised
three issues in addition to the constitutional arguments concerning the law
of libel and the fourteenth amendment. The ministers contended that there
was ample evidence that the suits against them had been instituted in an
effort to prevent black citizens from obtaining their full civil rights. 211 They
also claimed that the trial was conducted in an atmosphere of racial hostility
and racial segregation by a judge who had been elected in a manner which
prevented black citizens from voting-all in violation of the fourteenth
192. Id. at 29-30.
193. Id.
194. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 18, 6 Record, New York Times.
195. Id. at 18-27.
196. Id. at 27.
197. Id. at 27.
198. Id. at 35-42.
199. Id. at 42.
200. Petition For Writ of Certiorari To The Supreme Court of Alabama at 16-19, 6 Record,
New York Times.
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amendment.2"' Finally, the four Alabama ministers maintained that there
was no evidence in the record to hold them liable for the content or publica-
tion of the advertisement. 2 '
In the brief for respondent in opposition to the ministers' petition for
writ of certiorari, counsel for Sullivan raised only two issues: first, that the
Court should not consider federal questions not raised at trial and not
appearing in the record;203 and second, that there was sufficient evidence
presented by Sullivan of the ministers' authorization of the use of their names
in the advertisement.2 0 4
In the petitions for writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court was presented
with guideposts which marked the course of the subsequent briefs and oral
argument. The issues presented can be broadly divided into three groups.
First, the Times took the position that the interpretation of the law of libel
by the Alabama courts was so broad as to constitute seditious libel. Sullivan,
however, argued that the statements in the advertisement presented a classic
case of defamation which was not protected by the first amendment. Second,
the Times maintained that despite the exaggerations in the advertisement,
it did not injure or threaten Sullivan's reputation. Sullivan contended that
the seventh amendment precluded the Supreme Court from reviewing a jury
verdict and that the Court could not reexamine the evidence. Finally, the
parties disagreed on whether the nature and extent of the Times's activities
in Alabama were sufficient to meet the constitutional standards for minimum
contacts.
C. Briefs to the Supreme Court
The petition for the writ of certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court without comment.2 ' In its brief for the petitioner, counsel
for the Times presented the same four questions that it raised in its petition
for a writ of certiorari.20 6 The Times, however, sharpened the focus of the
constitutional argument relating to the law of libel and indicated to the Court
the scope of the ruling it sought.
While arguing that the Alabama Supreme Court "entirely misconceived
the constitutional issue," 20 7 the Times took a narrow approach and did not
maintain that the first amendment should be interpreted so as to give an
absolute privilege against recovery. Instead, the Times took the position that
the Alabama Supreme Court had revived the law of seditious libel by
overstating the traditional law of libel in interpreting it to cover the facts
of this case. 20 1
201. Id. at 19-22.
202. Id. at 22-23.
203. Brief For Respondent in Opposition at 12-14, 6 Record, New York Times.
204. Id. at 14-19.
205. 371 U.S. 946 (1963).
206. Brief For Petitioner at 2, 6 Record, New York Times.
207. Id. at 29.
208. Id. at 30.
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According to the Times, even if the protection of the official reputations
of government officials was a valid state interest, the means adopted by the
Alabama courts to further this interest was too extreme.2"' Even if the lower
court's interpretation was valid, its application to the facts of the case was
unconstitutional." ' As in the petition for a writ of certiorari, in its brief,
the Times reviewed the facts in the case and found nothing in the evidence
to support a finding of injury or threat to Sullivan's reputation.2 ' Finally,
the Times again raised its objection to the circuit court's assumption of
jurisdiction. It argued that jurisdiction violated the territorial limits of due
process, imposed a burden on interstate commerce, and threatened freedom
of the press.22
In the brief for respondent, counsel for Sullivan also made the same
arguments as in the brief in opposition to the petition for writ of certiorari.2 3
One point stressed in the opposition brief, however, is critical. Counsel for
Sullivan interpreted the Times's arguments as calling for an absolute privilege
to defame public officials.21 ' To counter these arguments, he cited numerous
decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts. 2" Yet this was
not what the Times was seeking from the Court. The brief for the Times
was framed to allow the Court to fashion a decision no broader than required
by the facts in this particular case: that the first amendment does not per-
mit a conclusion that a statement is libelous per se when the plaintiff, a
government official, has not been named and there is no intent to injure
him. 216
In their brief to the Supreme Court, the four Alabama ministers stressed
four points: that the civil libel prosecution was really a scheme to surpress
the constitutional rights of Negro citizens;2 7 that the verdict of the Alabama
courts violated the due process clause since there was no evidence on the
record to support their liability;2 8 that the Alabama rule requiring "retrac-
tion" even when a person has not authorized a publication violated the first
amendment; 2 9 and that the segregated courtroom, the all-white jury, and
the trial before a judge elected on the basis of discrimination in voting rights
violated the fourteenth amendment.22 Sullivan presented the same arguments
209. Id. at 31.
210. Id. at 32.
211. Id. at 32-34.
212. Id. at 34.
213. Brief For Respondent at 2-3, 6 Record, New York Times.
214. Id. at 33.
215. Id. at 28-38; see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961) (certain forms
of speech are considered outside the scope of constitutional protection); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (unconditional phrasing of the first amendment does not prevent
the Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within constitutionally protected
speech).
216. Brief for Petitioner at 60-66, 6 Record, New York Times.
217. Brief For Petitioners at 26-43, 6 Record, New York Times.
218. Id. at 8-9.
219. Id. at 44-52.
220. Id. at 52-61.
[Vol. 33:741
NEW YORK TIMES IN RETROSPECT
that were made in the brief in opposition to the petition for writ of
certiorari.2 2'
D. Oral Argument
After submitting the briefs in the case, a consolidated oral argument in
New York Times and Abernathy v. Sullivan was held on the 6th and 7th
of January 1964. Professor Wechsler began oral argument for the Times
by taking the Court through the advertisement paragraph by paragraph, and
conceding certain "inaccuracies" in the third and sixth paragraphs.222 In
response to a question by Justice Brennan as to whether libel was claimed
for "every statement and every sentence" of the third and sixth paragraphs,223
Professor Wechsler replied: "The pleadings do not separate out any par-
ticular statement . . . so that we are at a loss . . . to know precisely in
what respect the Respondent claims that he was libeled."' 2 2 He emphasized
that Sullivan's name did not appear anywhere in the advertisement and that
even the word "police" could not be taken to refer to Sullivan because the
department was under the day-to-day control of the Montgomery police
chief.225 Justice White appeared to accept this argument when he asked if
"police" could refer to state as well as city police, to which Professor
Wechsler replied: "It could be the state police. It could be." '226
Professor Wechsler also contended that the advertisement had been judged
in Alabama by an unconstitutional rule of law which violated the first
amendment.22 Following the line of argument laid out in the brief, Pro-
fessor Wechsler said that the same criticisms could be made against the
Alabama courts' interpretation of the rule of libel as Madison and Jeffer-
son made against the Sedition Act of 1789.228
While Professor Wechsler raised the issue of absolute immunity, he alter-
natively sought a narrow holding from the Court based solely on the facts
of the case. In a dialogue with Justice Goldberg, he developed his position
and presented the Court with a number of possible alternative holdings. The
dialogue proceeded as follows:
Justice Goldberg: Mr. Wechsler, your basic position, if I understand it
correctly, is that under the First and Fourteenth Amendment no public
official can sue for libel consitutionally and get a verdict with respect to
any type of false or malicious statement made concerning conduct, his
official conduct?
221. Brief For Respondent at 2-3, 6 Record, New York Times.
222. The transcript of oral argument in New York Times is reprinted in 58 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 683 (P. Kurland
& G. Kasper eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS].
223. Id. at 689.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 689-90.
226. Id. at 690.
227. Id. at 693-96.
228. Id. at 696.
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Mr. Wechsler: That is the broadest statement that I make. But I wish
in my remaining time to indicate what the lesser submissions are, because
there are many that I think must produce a reversal in this case.229
As an alternative to the sweeping extension of the first amendment suggested
by Justice Goldberg, Professor Wechsler offered four possibilities: first, a
qualified privilege could be given to a person who falsely and maliciously
libels a public official;23 second, a public official suing for an alleged libelous
statement regarding his official conduct could be required to prove actual
damage;"' third, the Supreme Court could review the facts in such libel
cases to ensure that they did not infringe upon the first amendment;232 and
finally, limits could be placed on the power of the jury to assess damages
in such libel cases. 233
As to the Times's argument that its contacts with Alabama were insuffi-
cient to justify the jurisdiction of that state's courts, Professor Wechsler
rested on the brief and did not raise the matter during oral argument.
Roland Nachman, Jr. of Montgomery appeared for Sullivan in oral
argument. 34 He began by repeating his twin arguments that not only was
there "ample and indeed overwhelming evidence to support the jury ver-
dict" but "we are here after a jury trial, with all that means in terms of
the Seventh Amendment. ' 23 This prompted the following exchange with
Justice Goldberg:
Justice Goldberg: You made a rather provocative statement I would like
to ask you about. You said a jury trial in terms of the Seventh Amend-
ment. . . .Is it your idea that the Seventh Amendment applies to states
by the Fourteenth?
229. Id. at 700.
230. Id. at 701.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 702.
234. Although counsel to Sullivan throughout the proceedings, Mr. Nachman had long
represented Mongomery's two newspapers, the Montgomery Advertiser and the Alabama Jour-
nal. Mr. Nachman has stated that he took the New York Times case with the blessing of
the two newspapers but jokes that his clients "think the best thing I ever did was lose the
case." See Landmark Ruling On Law of Libel Turns 20 Today, L.A. Daily Journal, Mar.
9, 1984, at 16, col. 4.
235. See LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 222, at 707. In Bose Corp. v. Con-
sumers Union of the United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984), the Supreme Court com-
mented on the seventh amendment issue raised in New York Times:
In New York Times v. Sullivan, we were reviewing a state court judgment entered
on a jury verdict. Respondent had contended that the Seventh Amendment precluded
an independent review. Recognizing that the Seventh Amendment's ban on
re-examination of facts tried by a jury applied to a case coming from the state
courts, . . .we found the argument without merit, relying on our statement in
Fiske v. Kansas .... that review of findings of fact is appropriate "where a con-
clusion as to a Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make
it necessary, in order to pass upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts."
Id. at 1964 n. 27 (citations omitted).
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Mr. Nachman: C.B.&.Q. v. Chicago . . . and many other cases, say the
protections of the Seventh Amendment which surround the re-examination
of jury verdicts apply equally to state jury verdicts as they do to federal
jury verdicts.236
Later in oral argument, the question of the deference required by the seventh
amendment to state jury verdicts was raised again, this time by Justice White,
in connection with Mr. Nachman's contention that libel was outside the pro-
tection of the first amendment:
Justice White: I suppose if it's your assertion . . . that libel falls outside
the protection of the First Amendment, that someone has to finally decide
what libel is that falls outside the protection of the First Amendment?
Mr. Nachman: Now, we would certainly concede that if a statement was
made that somebody had blond hair and a state court held this statement
was libelous per se, well, of course this Court could review it. But, ...
we say that when this kind of conduct is charged this is within the normal
usual, rubric framework of libel. 2"'
The basis of Mr. Nachman's argument was the same as that relied on by
Sullivan at trial. He maintained that the statements in the advertisement were
false, "not just in some particular but completely false." '238 This prompted
Justice Goldberg to ask: "Are you arguing to us the case went to the jury
on the posture that this ad was from beginning to end totally false?" '239
Mr. Nachman: Yes sir.
Justice Goldberg: You are?
Mr. Nachman: What I am saying, sir, is that there was evidence from
the New York Times itself, from the pleadings, from statements of its
counsel, from evidence in the case, in addition to this, which could justify
a jury verdict that the entire ad was false.2"'
Justice Douglas, however, quickly pointed out that the jury did not decide
the issue of truth or falsity of the advertisement because the trial judge
charged the jury that the statements were libelous per se.24'
Justice Goldberg, obviously intrigued by Mr. Nachman's statement that
everything in the advertisement was false, then asked Mr. Nachman about
his second argument, that the statements in the advertisement referred to
Sullivan. When asked what in paragraph three referred to Sullivan, Mr.
Nachman replied that everything did except the expulsion of the students.24 2
236. See LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 222, at 707.
237. Id. at 711.
238. Id. at 709.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 709-10.
241. Id. at 711.
242. Id. at 715.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
As to paragraph six, Mr. Nachman stated that the repeated use of the word
"they" would be connected with the "they" who arrested Dr. King: the
police. 243
Justice Goldberg was concerned by the possible scope of Mr. Nachman's
argument and questioned how far he was prepared to take it:
Justice Goldberg: Since the advertisement as a whole refers to southern
violators, and since your client testified that the community itself was
libeled, since there are many, many law abiding citizens in the South as
well as some who are not law abiding, as in all sections of the country,
what would prevent under your theory of the case any citizen in the South
saying that "I am libeled by this ad of the Times," and by innuendo
then allege and go to the jury on the assumption that I am a southern
citizen, this refers to southern violators, the "they" means I bombed, that
I did all these things?
Mr. Nachman: The thing that would prevent it in Alabama... is Alabama
jurisprudence . . . which requires a group be sufficiently small so that
the identification can readily be made, and that a person in an entire com-
munity under Alabama law would not have standing to sue because the
diffusion of the attack, and the diffusion of the invidious remarks, would
be so great that under Alabama law it could not be applied to this man
as a member of the community with no other individual as a plaintiff
in the lawsuit. 2"'
Finally, Mr. Nachman concluded by disputing Professor Wechsler's view of
the law of libel:
We think that the defendant, in order to succeed, must convince this Court
that a newspaper corporation has an absolute immunity from anything
it publishes .... If a newspaper charges, say, a mayor or police commis-
sioner with taking a bribe, that there is an absolute immunity against a
libel suit in that regard. We think that is something brand new in our
jurisprudence. We think that it would have a devastating effect on this
nation."'
The four Alabama ministers were represented in oral argument before the
Supreme Court by former Attorney-General William P. Rogers and by Samuel
R. Pierce. Rogers and Pierce concentrated on the four arguments that they
presented in their brief.2"
Roland Nachman appeared again in oral argument for Sullivan. Justice
Black began by asking him whether there was sufficient evidence on which
the jury could find that the ministers were responsible for their names
appearing on the advertisement.2"7 Mr. Nachman replied that first, the
243. Id.
244. Id. at 716-17.
245. Id. at 721-22.
246. For a summary of oral argument in Abernathy v. Sullivan, see 32 U.S.L.W. 3251 (Jan.
14, 1964).
247. Id.
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ministers' names appeared in the advertisement; second, that they failed to
reply to a request to retract the advertisement, and third, that under Alabama
law such a "failure to break silence indicates they did what we said they
did. 2 8 Justice Goldberg then asked: "Is it your contention that if my name
appears on an advertisement without my consent, I must pay $5000 to get
the benefit of the Alabama retraction statute?"' 24 9 Mr. Nachman replied that
a letter to the editor of the newspaper would be sufficient.250 Justice Goldberg,
however, then wanted to know: "Suppose the newspaper didn't publish the
letter?" 2" Mr. Nachman replied that in such a case the person would have
done all he could and would meet the requirements of the statute. 52 But
Justice Goldberg then asked why there should be any obligation to deny
something that a person has not published.2"3 Mr. Nachman responded by
saying that this is a rule of evidence: a failure to reply to an inculpatory
statement is an admission of guilt. 54
However strong Mr. Nachman's case may have been, his position was
weakened by Justice Goldberg and Chief Justice Warren, if not all the
Justices, in the following exchange:
Justice Goldberg: I get a lot of mail every day I don't answer. Without
a prior relationship between the parties, I can't conceive a rule of law
that says you must reply.
Mr. Nachman: We submit that it is, your Honor.
Chief Justice Warren: It is not unknown to at least one member of
this Court that he has received letters from various parts of the country
accusing him of making libelous statements. If he made no such state-
ment, must he reply and retract or suffer a one-half million dollar libel
judgement?
Mr. Nachman: I'm not familiar with the contents of the letters.
Chief Justice Warren: They're far worse than this one.
Mr. Nachman: When it becomes important later in a law suit, then we
submit his failure to reply may be evidence that he made it.2"
For the Times and the four Alabama ministers, oral argument was a chance
to highlight the arguments from their briefs in a sympathetic forum. This
was not the case, however, with counsel for Sullivan. Given the dimensions
of the jury's verdict in the particular fact situation, coupled with counsel's
argument that the seventh amendment precluded Supreme Court review of
such a jury decision, it is not surprising that the questions from the bench
were less than sympathetic.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 3251-52.
255. Id. at 3252.
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E. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court that heard and decided the New York Times case
in early 1964 was both an "activist" court and a divided court. While
involved in giving an expanded meaning to the Constitution, the Court was
often deeply divided over the role it should play in the political process.
Philip Kurland, in his "Foreward" to the Harvard Law Review's sum-
mary of the 1963 Supreme Court term,2"6 referred to that term as the climax
of "the egalitarian revolution,"2 7 which was characterized by equality as
a guide for constitutional decisions, and a subordination of the federal system.
Certainly the decisions of the Court during that term indicate that it was
deeply committed to continuing the revolution. Desegregation,"'
reapportionment," 9 and the first of the "sit-in" cases 61 were all issues that
came before the Court during the 1963 term.
While many of these cases were decided by narrow votes with vigorous
dissents, the Court had no trouble agreeing on the New York Times case.
On March 9, 1964, by an unanimous vote, the Supreme Court reversed the
decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court in both the New York Times and
Abernathy cases. 2 61 Speaking through Justice Brennan, in shaping its deci-
sion the Court not only rejected all of Sullivan's arguments but went beyond
what the Times had urged in its brief and oral argument.
Justice Brennan began by rejecting Sullivan's argument that the fourteenth
amendment did not apply to the case since it was meant to apply only to
state action.2 62 Although this was a civil suit between private persons, the
Court said that state action was involved because the Alabama state courts
had applied a state rule of law which the Times claimed placed unconstitu-
tional restrictions on its freedoms of speech and press. 63
Sullivan's principal argument, both in his brief and oral argument, had
been that the advertisement was not protected by the first amendment. This
argument was premised on the narrow ground that the advertisement was
"commercial advertising," and on a broader contention that the first amend-
ment does not protect libel.2"" The Court rejected both of these arguments.2 6
The Court said that it did not consider the advertisement "commercial" in
the sense that the term was used in Valentine v. Chrestensen,16 a case
involving the distribution of handbills containing a commercial message on
256. Kurland, Foreward: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964).
257. Id. at 145.
258. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
259. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
260. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
261. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 292.
262. Id. at 265.
263. Id.
264. Brief for Respondent at 28-38, 6 Record, New York Times.
265. 376 U.S. at 266.
266. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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one side and a protest against certain government action on the other side.
Here, the Court said the Times advertisement "communicated information,
expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought
financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives
are matters of the highest public interest and concern. 267
Although counsel for Sullivan cited numerous cases for the proposition
that the first amendment does not protect libel, the Court rejected these
cases, concluding that none dealt with "the use of libel laws to impose sanc-
tions upon expressions critical of the official conduct of public officials." 2 68
The Court said that it was thus free of precedent in deciding the question
and held that like "the various other formulae for the repression of expres-
sion that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendement." '26 9
With the first amendment as its test, the Court then looked at the Alabama
courts' application of the rule of libel to the facts in the case. After com-
paring the Alabama law of criminal libel with the civil law,27 the Court
concluded that the state was trying to use its civil law to exact a punishment
forbidden by its criminal law. 27 This, the Court said, violated the first and
fourteenth amendments. Specifically, the Court stated that,
[t]he constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public offical from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.272
It is this "actual malice" test that has often been considered the basis of
the Court's criteria for recovery by public officials in defamation cases.
Although the term "actual malice" had been used by the Times in its brief,273
it was used in the sense of actual intent to cause the harmful result. The
Court, however, expanded this meaning to include not only knowledge of
the falsity of the statement but "reckless disregard" of the truth.27 '
Because the Alabama courts had not applied this test of actual malice
to the facts, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Alabama Supreme
Court and remanded the case. 2 5 The Court, however, then took the unusual
step of reviewing the facts itself to determine whether the evidence would
support a verdict of libel. The Court concluded that while the Times might
have been negligent in not discovering the misstatements in the advertise-
267. 376 U.S. at 266.
268. Id. at 268.
269. Id. at 269.
270. Id. at 277-78.
271. Id. at 277.
272. Id. at 279-80.
273. Brief for Petitioner at 31, 55, 6 Record, New York Times.
274. 376 U.S. at 280.
275. Id. at 292.
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ment, the evidence was not sufficient to meet the test of "actual malice." '276
As to the four Alabama ministers, the Court found that even if they had
authorized the use of their names in the advertisement, there was no evidence
to show "actual malice" on their part.2" Thus, even if Sullivan wished to
pursue the cases again on remand, the Court effectively precluded it by find-
ing no constitutional basis.
The question of the Alabama courts' jurisdiction over the Times, which
had consumed so much time and theory, was disposed of by the Court in
a footnote. '78 The Court said that the Times's claim that the assumption
of jurisdiction overreached the limits of the due process clause was fore-
closed from review by the ruling that the Times had entered a general
appearance and waived its jurisdictional objections. 79
276. Id. at 286.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 264 n.4. The Court said in part:
Since we sustain the contentions of all the petitioners under the First Amendment's
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press as applied to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, we do not decide the questions presented by the other
claims of violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. .
279. Id. In two unanimous decisions in March 1984, the Supreme Court held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not bar a suit against a publication in a
state based on regular circulation of the publication in the state. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (1984), the Court held that a publication may be sued for libel
in any state in which it widely circulates, regardless of where the plaintiff lives. In Keeton,
the plaintiff, a New York resident, filed suit against Hustler magazine, an Ohio corporation,
in New Hampshire because the statute of limitations had expired in every other state. Id. at
1477. In holding that defendant's circulation of 15,000 copies per month of its magazine was
sufficient contact with the state to permit the suit to proceed there, the Court said that neither
the plaintiff's lack of contact with New Hampshire nor her tactical reasons for choosing the
state were relevant. Id. at 1481. According to the Court, where Hustler "has continuously
and deliberately exploited the New Hampshire market, it must reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there in a libel action based on the contents of its magazine. . . .There is no
unfairness in calling it to answer for the contents of that publication wherever a substantial
number of copies are regularly sold and distributed." Id. at 1481-82.
In a companion case, the Court ruled that individual reporters and editors may be sued
for libel in the courts of a distant state, even one they have never visited, when the plaintiff
lives in the state and the publication is widely circulated there. Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct.
1482, 1487 (1984). In Calder, the Court upheld California's jurisdiction over a Florida based
newspaper premised upon the distribution of 600,000 copies of the newspaper in the state per
week. Id. The Court said that it was not relevant that defendants did not do any work on
the allegedly libelous article in California or whether, in fact, they had ever been there. Id.
According to the Court, the article
concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the profes-
sionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The
article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms
both of respondent's emotional distress and the injury to her professional reputa-
tion, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the
story and the harm suffered.
Id. at 1486-87 (footnote omitted).
Both in Keeton and Calder, the Court emphasized the defendants' large circulation in New
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The concurring opinions of Justice Black and Justice Goldberg, both of
whom were joined by Justice Douglas, argued that the majority did not go
far enough to provide adequate protection for critics of official conduct."'
These Justices would have created an absolute privilege, whereas the majority
had created a qualified privilege which could be overcome by proof of actual
malice. Justice Goldberg, however, would have retained an area of private
life in which public officials would have the benefits of the ordinary rules
of defamation. 2"'
IV. CONCLUSION
For the Times and the four Alabama ministers, the decision of the Supreme
Court had the immediate effect of relieving them of the burden of a $500,000
damage judgment. But the decision also had far broader implications. It
assisted the civil rights movement by removing the threat of large libel
judgments against those who criticized and acted against racial segregation.
It also defined the ambit of constitutional protection generally in libel actions
brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.At a seminar
commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision
in New York Times, Sullivan's attorney, Roland Nachman, recounted the
strengths and fatal weaknesses of his case:
I had felt at the time of the presentation of this case that the law of
libel and the facts of record were very much with us; and that extrinsic
circumstances over which the lawyers in the case had no control-including
the amount of the verdict, the unfortunate political and social climate,
and the proliferation of contemporaneous law suits brought by others-
made this a very hard case for the plaintiff.2"2
At the same seminar Mr. Nachman also explained that "I fear-so long
as I continue to represent media publishers-I am in constant danger of
losing the New York Times case twice." 2 3 The history of the Court's treat-
ment of media defendants in defamation cases since 1964, however, indicates
that the decision which arose out of the blacks' struggle for civil rights in
the South in the early sixties has produced a rare and continuing consensus
on the Court that the first amendment requires that the media be given special
protection in defamation cases.2" ' The parameters of that protection are the
subject of continuing debate.28 5
Hampshire and California. Since the Times was not widely circulated in Alabama, it is unclear
whether these decisions answer completely the jurisdiction question left open by the Court.
280. 376 U.S. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); 376 U.S. at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring in
result).
281. Id. at 301-02 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
282. Losing Landmark Case "Greatest Thing" For Libel Lawyer, The Birmingham News,
Apr. 15, 1984, at 6A, col. 1.
283. Id.
284. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions in defamation cases against the media
since the New York Times case, see supra note 2.
285. See War, TV and Truth, 70 A.B.A.J. 25 (Sept. 1984) (discussing Westmoreland v. CBS,
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Mr. Nachman's concerns centered around the scope of the protection to
be given media publishers in libel suits brought by public officials. The
members of the Supreme Court and of the Bar have also been concerned
with the application of the New York Times decision to divergent factual
situations, although for different reasons. First, the Court has attempted
to define who is a public official or a public figure. Since no definition
applicable to all cases can be developed, the Court has had to proceed on
a case-by-case basis. The result has been that, in all of the cases in which
this has been an issue, the Court has held that the plaintiffs were not public
figures or public officials.2"6 Thus, the Court has not taken an expansive
view of who must prove actual malice in order to recover in a defamation
suit against the media. Second, the Court has also been concerned with clari-
fying the procedural aspects of proving actual malice and litigating a defama-
tion case. Here again, the Court has sided with plaintiffs by making it easier
for them to discover the information necessary to prove actual malice287 and
to bring defamation suits against the media.288 These cases, however, do
not alter the substantive law under which defamation cases against the media
must actually be tried.
Despite the concern created by these decisions, the most recent media
defamation case decided by the Supreme Court indicates that not only are
Mr. Nachman's fears of losing the New York Times case a second time not
well founded, but that the decision is being expanded to cover areas never
envisioned by the litigants or the Court that decided it. In Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 89 the Court upheld the right of
an appeals court to overturn a trial court's finding that a magazine had
acted with actual malice when it published critical comments about
loudspeakers manufactured by Bose Corporation.
The Court in Bose began by reaffirming the protection for the media set
out in the New York Times decision.29 ° According to the Court, the first
amendment values protected by that decision "make it imperative that
judges-and in some cases judges of this Court-make sure that it is cor-
rectly applied." 29 ' In order to do this, the Court held that an appellate court
should review a trial court's factual, as well as legal, conclusions about
No. 82 C 7913 PNL (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 30, 1982); Can Generals Waging War Be Wounded
By the Press?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1984, at 18E, col. 1; Westmoreland's Suit Against CBS
Begins Today With Jury Selection, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, at 1; Westmoreland's Suit Against
CBS Raises Unusual Libel Issues, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Labunski, Trial Will
Test Law, Plain Dealer, Sept. 14, 1984, at IIB, col. 1.
286. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
287. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
288. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 104
S. Ct. 1482 (1984). For a discussion of these cases, see supra note 279.
289. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
290. Id. at 1959.
291. Id. at 1960.
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whether the media acted with actual malice.292 Because an appellate court
in other types of lawsuits must accept the trial court's view of the facts
unless it is "clearly erroneous," '93 this gives an appellate court the freedom
to conduct a "de novo" review in defamation cases. The Bose case thus
provides the media with added procedural protection against trial court deci-
sions which often favor plaintiffs.
9 4
The Court in Bose also held that the actual malice requirement was
applicable to cases of product disparagement. The Court stated that "this
case represents the sort of inaccuracy that is commonplace in the forum
of robust debate to which the New York Times rule applies." '295 Although
the dissent questioned the application of "a constitutional principle which
originated in New York Times v. Sullivan because of the need for freedom
to criticize the conduct of public officials . . . to a magazine's false statements
about a commercial loudspeaker system," '2 96 it did not elaborate on this
concern.
Thus, the Bose case indicates that the continued vitality of the New York
Times decision will not be the issue in the future. Instead, the Court will
continue to debate the meaning of its test of actual malice and how far
this requirement should be expanded.
292. Id. at 1965.
293. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous and due regard shall
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
294. A study conducted by the Libel Defense Resource Center of libel actions between 1981 and
1984 against media defendants found that while news organizations eventually prevail in more than
90% of the cases, they lost 83% of the initial jury trials. See Of Reputations and Reporters, TIME,
Mar. 19, 1984, at 64; see also Franklin, Suing the Media for Libel, 1981 AM. B. FoUNDATION
RESEARCH J. 795 (summarizing the results of a study of 291 libel cases brought against the media).
295. 104 S. Ct. at 1966.
296. Id.
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